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This paper examines the unit training costs, defined
herein as company and battalion level training, associated
with the introduction of a new weapon system into the Army
inventory. The Army Life Cycle Cost Model does not address
unit training costs, and accordingly there is a significant
cost during the acquisition process that is not recognized.
Recommendations are included for a means to arrive at life
cycle cost figures that include unit training and also enable
unit commanders to anticipate training requirements
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
With technological advancements in warfare, and in the
weapons designed for that warfare, increased emphasis has
been placed on cost-effectiveness analysis in an effort to
procure the most effective and efficient hardware available.
Such efforts entail analysis of complex interrelationships
among man, machine, and organization. Conceptually, one-
half of the cost-effectiveness analysis consists of arriving
at a life cycle cost for a proposed system. "Life Cycle
Costing" has been a recognized term in the defense industry
since the early 1960 's. As a formal concept, it was
initiated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Logistics.
Life cycle costs play the following roles in defense
management. During a system's definition phase, life cycle
cost estimates are parametric cost equations used to
estimate the system's ultimate cost; and during a system's
development phase, life cycle cost estimates are used to
identify the minimum cost system. Life cycle costs are an
attempt to describe all costs of acquisition and ownership
incurred over a specified period of time, typically ten
years. As such, it decomposes total costs by such broad
categories as development, production, operation and
support. Mathematical equations, whose arguments include

a system's performance or descriptive parameters, are used
to predict the variation in cost of each of the components
of a weapon system.
Among the more difficult costs to estimate are those
involving training. The life cycle cost model currently
used by the Army is described in DA Pamphlets 11-2,-3, and
-4. It addresses individual training in considerable depth.
Allowances are made for initial, replacement, and recurring
training for skills needed to man a particular weapon system.
As will be shown, the life cycle cost model currently
in use does not address the costs associated with unit
training generated by the introduction of a new weapon
system. Unit training as discussed in this paper refers to
that training conducted by company and battalion level
units belonging to operational commands. The basic purpose
of this paper is to identify the costs that a unit incurs
because it is issued a new weapon system. The authors do
not believe sufficient attention has been given to the unit
training aspect in the cost estimation process. The costs
in question which have been termed "transition costs" by
the authors, include recurring and non-recurring training
costs. They will vary greatly with the type of weapon
system being considered. Such parameters as the number of
systems per unit, crew members per system, and complexity
of operation and employment will all impact heavily on the

magnitude of unit training cost involved. Thus, a decision
concerns which of several proposed systems should be procured,
and the life cycle costs of each system are a key element
in that decision. The decision-maker should have the more
complete life cycle cost estimate including unit training
costs.
One cannot correctly define or determine training
costs, however, without considering the output, or effect-
iveness, of the training. That is, a given level of
training may be found to cost $x; the problem then becomes
one of determining whether that given training level
achieves a desired level of effectiveness. Analysts are
then faced with determining the marginal effect that
additional dollars invested in training will produce.
During the development phase of the acquisition process
such determinations are largely subjective. However,
through discussions with individuals who will be employing
the new system, by analysis of historical data concerning
similar weapons, and by testing of prototypes, reasonable
estimates of training effectiveness can be made.
Once effectiveness has been estimated, the problem
becomes one of determining the costs of a unit achieving
that level of effectiveness. There is a degradation of
readiness that occurs initially upon receipt of a new
weapon system. The magnitude of this degradation will

vary with the weapon system and the extent to which
externalities impact on the unit. The availability of
trained personnel in the unit at the time the weapon system
is received acts to reduce the training time required to
return to the previous level of combat effectiveness.
However, some period of time is required, even with trained
personnel, for the unit to become proficient with the
tactical employment of the new system. During this time,
costs are incurred in returning the unit to its previous
level of readiness. It is those costs upon which this
paper will focus. A graphic portrayal of this major
premise is shown at Figure 1.
B. APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
In attempting to derive a system for including unit
training costs in a life cycle cost model, one must first
examine the cost model currently in use. This examination
includes a description of the pertinent parts of the model;
that is, it examines those portions in which unit training
costs would most logically fall. An understanding of
what the current model does and does not include is
essential in considering the problem.
An analysis of training costs inevitably leads to a
notion of training effectiveness. The authors will survey
the current developments in training techniques that are
































array of methods that permit varying degrees of force on
force engagements in field environments, as well as computer
and computer assisted training systems. The framework in
which these training techniques are employed is important
in understanding the methods of training effectiveness
analyses used. The various types of training analyses
conducted by the Army are discussed in an effort to provide
an understanding of the timing and importance of such
considerations in the acquisition process. An overview of
current developments in these areas will assist in an
understanding of the costs involved in unit training.
This paper will next examine the cost components of
unit training including an explanation of the costs
that are relevant for the problem under consideration.
The Training Management Control System (TMCS) will be
explained, for it ties directly into the training parameters
described and may hold the key to a better unit training
cost estimating methodology. A methodology is proposed,
using data collected by the TMCS, for estimating unit
training costs induced by new weapon systems. No additional
hardware or massive data collection effort is required
to implement the methodology presented.
One may ask why it is important to estimate the unit
training cost, in that it would appear to be an insigni-
ficant percentage of the operating and support costs.
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However, it is not possible to substantiate that appearance,
in that no relevant data is formally collected by the Army.
Therefore it is important to estimate unit training costs
separately.
In attempting to isolate an example of transition costs
associated with the introduction of a new weapon system,
the authors have chosen the Army's heavy anti-tank weapon,
the TOW. The TOW is currently the major operational
weapon system for enabling the infantry to survive in an
armor-threat environment. It is a simple weapon system to
operate, however, its introduction has caused major changes
in infantry doctrine, which requires greater emphasis on
unit training in becoming proficient in its employment.
This shift in emphasis from individual to unit training
warrents an analysis of costs incurred.
The 7th Infantry Division, located at Ft. Ord, California
was receiving the TOW during the research for this paper,
and was therefore selected as a case to study. It is
significant to note that the transition costs studied
represent at least 1.3% of the entire Operations and
Maintenance budget for the 7th Division in FY 77.
How a system's transition costs can be expected to vary
with parametric changes in the weapon system's performance
characteristics is beyond the scope of this paper. This
thesis has only the limited objective of delineating a
13

method for estimating the magnitude of a system's
transition costs.
II. LIFE CYCLE COSTS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter addresses the concept of Life Cycle Costs
(LCC) and discusses what part they play in the cost
analysis of weapon systems as well as how they come into
play in the problem addressed by this paper.
The term life cycle cost is generally defined as
follows: "Life Cycle costs include all anticipated
expenditures directly or indirectly associated with an
2
alternative." Another way of looking at life cycle costs
3is given by the Joint Tactical Communications Office.
"... the costs that reflect the total resources required
and consumed during the complete life cycle..." and
"In general, these kinds of costs include total cost of
acquisition and ownership of the equipment over its full
economic life."
In the context of this paper then life cycle costs are
to be understood as the total cost to the government of
the acquisition and ownership of a particular weapon
system. "Costs" are usually defined by either a measure
of the resources consumed or of the alternatives foregone.
The reader should not confuse these references to cost
14

as "accounting" costs, which are records of money expended
for resources. There are, at least conceptually, more
satisfactory ways to measure costs.
4Fisher states that there are four ways to measure
costs; by the resources required, by the alternative uses
of the resources, by the value of the alternatives, or by
the dollar expenditures to acquire the resources. The life
cycle cost approach looks at the measurement of costs in
dollars usually, since the choice situation is assumed to
have a distant time horizon. The cost measurement by the
highest valued foregone alternative opportunity can also
be used when comparing system effectiveness. However, the
dollar cost measurement remains the most popular.
The Army force structure is created incrementally.
That is, changes in the force structure are the result of
decisions to introduce new weapon systems or alter the
table of organization of relatively small units. Technical
changes are introduced through a variety of new weapon
systems that are adopted and gradually phased in to the
inventory. Many of these technical changes are embodied in
the weapon systems as the result of loosely coordinated
decisions on adoption of the new system. Often many of the
changes induced by a new system are not recognized until
after the weapon system has been in the hands of units for
some period of time.
15

The officially recognized decision methodology used in
weapon system acquisition is the LCC and a localized
measure of effectiveness. This methodology requires that
two assiimptions be made: (1) It assumes that the measure
of effectiveness used is measurable in a globally consistent
manner. That is, the effectiveness of the weapon system
in a European, high intensity environment is measurable in
the same manner as the same weapon system employed in a
Southeast Asian, low intensity environment. This assumption
is not germaine to this paper and will not be pursued.
(2) The use of LCC assumes that the decision concerning
acquisition of the weapon system is to be made by evaluating
total LCC and choosing the system from among those providing
a given level of effectiveness that has the lowest LCC cost.
The validity of this assumption rests on a presumption of
the acceptability of a temporal transfer of the budget
between years without regard to the amount to be spent in
any one year. Further, it is presumed that the probability
of war is so low, or so far in the future, that the decision
can focus on only peacetime costs.
While the LCC concept is sound, its implementation is
extremely difficult. The concept is based on the assumption
that procurement decisions will be made in terms of the
lowest LCC consistent with effectiveness. In practice,
decisions are alleged to be made in terms of the minimum
16

procurement cost, with little or no consideration being
given to operating and support costs that are not going to
be encountered until many years hence. Realistically, pro-
ject managers have very little organizationally provided
incentive to minimize operating and support costs when the
decision variable is the minimum procurement cost.
Additionally, the Army's force structure is managed
by units and not by weapon system. This means that
identification of a particular weapon system's operating
and support costs is extremely difficult, and perhaps
impossible, to accurately determine. The absence of
readily retrievable data for operating and support costs
leads the decision maker to focus on procurement costs
alone.
Implementation of the LCC concept is also obstructed
by a failure to explicitly recognize that the effect of
a weapon system's introduction on a force unit's total
effectiveness should be charged to the LCC of that weapon
system. That is, a cost element is required in the LCC
model that accounts for additional training requirements
generated by the new system. The absence of such a cost
element is indicative of the grave difficulties encountered
in implementing what is an overly simple conceptual
depiction of the functioning of the military's economy.
Further complexities are introduced if one considers
17

introduction of two or more weapons systems simultaneously
with synergistic effects on training requirements due to
interdependence between the systems.
"Inasmuch as new material or systems often affect
concepts of operation and organization/ the total costs
of material systems must include costs such as those
resulting from changes in unit training, firing practice,
and theater stockage, as well as the costs which are
directly associated with the acquisition of the material
5
system." That is, life cycle costs must recognize the
differential of resources consumed due to change in
operational procedures. '
B. LIFE CYCLE COST COMPONENTS
To provide further insight into what life cycle costs
are and how they reflect the total cost of a system, an
g
examination of the components of life cycle costs follows:
1
I Development Costs - Those expenditures associated with
developing the technological know-how to produce the new
capability. Usually this cost is not a function of how
many systems are bought nor of the time needed to develop
the capability only.
I
Investment Costs - Outlays which are involved with producing
the needed equipment and setting up the new program. These
costs are a function of the magnitude of the program as
well as a function of the production rates and schedules.
18

They are not considered to be a function of the time of
operational use by the force. That is, they may be
considered a one-time cost of introducing a capability into
the operational inventory.
Operating and Support Costs - These are all the additional
costs of using the new capability or keeping it operationally
ready. These will be recurring costs required year by year
to operate and maintain equipment or weapon systems over a
period of years. Hence these costs are a function of both
the size (numbers) of the capability acquired and the length
of time for which it is to be operational.
By developing and estimating the total costs of a weapon
system over its projected economic or operational life, it
is then possible to develop relationships between selected
characteristics of such a weapon system and the costs which
are a direct result of that characteristic. In deriving a
cost estimating relationship, the degree of decomposition
of LCC is dictated by the ease of minimizing the variance
of the estimate. That is, very little decomposition would
be expected in arriving at an LCC by means of a parametric
estimate. Conversely, for effective management of a weapon
system greater disaggregation of the LCC would contribute




Two methods of estimating costs, industrial engineering
and parametric, are usually distinguished. The industrial
engineering consists of a "bottom-up" approach, that is a
consolidation of estimates from various separate components
or work segments into a total aggregation. This approach
is most useful when the system under consideration has
already been produced or greater accuracy is desired.
When there is a requirement for a grossly accurate cost
estimate and no similar system has ever been produced upon
which to base an industrial engineering cost estimate, a
parametric estimate is developed. This method depends upon
sufficient historical cost and performance data being
available to allow cost estimation relationships to be
developed using that performance characteristic as a cost
parameter. For example, through the use of simple linear
regression analysis the cost of a new type of airplane could
be estimated as a function of its airspeed (presumably
greater than any airplane now existing) or its weight (again
greater than any existing) , or both variables.
The problem that must be dealt with in using parametric
cost estimates is the possibility that structural inaccur-
acies may occur in their development. It must be remembered
that this method is used because there is no current or prior
system upon which the industrial engineering estimate can
20

be developed. This can also be taken to mean that the
proposed system is distinctly different than the current
system and not just a technological development. Because
the desired information extends beyond the limits of
existing data (known as the relevant range to statisticians)
it is inherently subject to wider confidence levels (is
more inaccurate) . The inaccuracy of this method is offset
primarily by the ease of development. While accuracy can
be improved over the course of time, this requires further
committment of resources which may not be appropriate in
the conceptual stages of a weapon system's development.
Therefore the parametric cost estimate is a trade-off of
accuracy for timeliness.
This estimating method is especially appropriate for
the TOW missile training since the biggest change introduced
was the tremendous increase in the range at which an
infantryman could disable or destroy a tank. With the old
system, the 106mm recoilless rifle, a tank could only be
engaged at a maximum of 110 meters. With the TOW the
maximum killing range is extended to 3000 meters.
From a systems analysis viewpoint, the LCC of TOW is
comparable to the LCC of the collection of weapon systems
which can provide an equivalent effectiveness. From a
system insertion viewpoint, the relevant LCC of TOW are
the cost components corresponding to the disaggregation of
21

management actions required in the introduction and peace-
time operation of the weapon system. One of the significant
LCC components in this regard is training costs.
D. THE RELATIONSHIP OF LCC TO TRANSITION COSTS
As stated in the introduction to this paper, a degrada-
tion of unit readiness occurs upon introduction of a new
weapon system into that unit. Because the life cycle cost
concept is intended to transmit the entirety of costs to
the decision maker, the authors believe that the cost of
regaining the required level of readiness should be
addressed by the life cycle cost model. There are three
characteristics of this effect which are described as
follows: (1) The unit sustains a reduced readiness
capability of an appreciable magnitude, the exact amount
depending on the extent to which the weapon system directly
or indirectly contributes to the unit's operational
capability or mission. The degradation of readiness is
also a function of the method used to integrate the weapon
system, that is, whether the replaced system is immediately
evacuated from the unit or whether the new system is used
as a parallel system until training is completed. In either
case there will be a degradation, but the magnitude may
differ. Other aspects of this reduction in readiness is
the qualification of operators and/or crews and the ability
of the unit commander to employ the system in a tactically
22

sound fashion. (2) After a unit overcomes the first
characteristic, there remains the recurring requirement
for periodic update training or refresher training within
the unit. This requirement falls under the function of
unit training and may require crew or operator requalifica-
tion on a periodic basis and may also require periodic unit
deployment under training evaluation conditions. (3) There
is a time during the introduction of a new weapon system
when the institutionalized training facilities of the Army
are unable to provide fully trained and qualified replace-
ment personnel to units equipped with the new system. The
third characteristic then is the requirement for the unit
to incur the cost of characteristic (1) above for replace-
ment personnel received into the unit prior to the replace-
ment system being able to adequately train and qualify
these replacements. With some weapon systems this may
always be present while for more sophisiticated systems the
deployment of the system may be implemented only after
institutionalized training is established.
The end result is that when a weapon system is
introduced to a unit and the cost of implementation has
not been recognized, then the budget constraint becomes a
factor. The unit, to achieve a required level of effective-
ness with the system, must expend or consume resources.
These resources then are not available for their original
planned use. This in turn leads to the familiar restrictions
23

on supplies or other conservation measures so frequently
encountered by units in the field.
In summary, this chapter has defined life cycle costs
and shown how they relate to the problem of weapon system
deployment and the associated training problem. The
following chapter will look at the unit training techniques
and their relationship to the Cost and Operational
Effectiveness Analysis and the Cost and Training Effective-
ness Analysis requirements.
III. CURRENT ARMY TRAINING AND TRAINING ANALYSIS METHODS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter begins with an examination of the various
types of training analysis methods currently employed
in the Army. Such a survey is useful in understanding
the types of training problems receiving attention Army-
wide. Additionally, it provides insight into the types
of analyses conducted during the development phase of
the acquisition process and which are used to support
proposals to enter the production phase. A brief survey
is then conducted of the current training techniques
being used, for it is within the framework of these
techniques that the training analyses for new weapon
systems are conducted. While training in the Army is
becoming increasingly dynamic, the techniques discussed
24

herein provide the reader with an overview of the direction
in which unit training is moving. Included also is a
description of the Army Training and Evaluation Program
(ARTEP) , around which all unit training in the Army revolves.
The chapter concludes with a description of the TOW weapon
system and a discussion of some of the problems generated
by its introduction which may have been precluded with
better analysis during the development phase.
B. TRAINING ANALYSIS METHODS
The decision to modify or replace an existing weapon
system is primarily based on the ability of the new system
to increase the effectiveness of the force structure. The
problem, then, is to quantitatively assess the degree to
which the proposed system contributes to the force structure
in terms of measures of effectiveness. There currently
exists a fairly well-defined body of literature concerning
techniques for measuring hardware performance and associated
costs. There does not exist, however, a similar pool of
analytical techniques for the measurement of the cost and
effectiveness of training. In many instances, the techniques
developed for evaluation of hardware appear applicable for
evaluation of training.
One of the principal objectives of life cycle costing
is to assure that all aspects of a weapon system that
require use of scarce resources are addressed in the
25

analysis that supports the acquisition process. The
major components of any weapon system are personnel,
training, logistics, hardware, and procedures. Accordingly,
each of the five components should be afforded in-depth
analysis for the weapon system to be objectively evaluated.
Historically, only the hardware portion of the system has
been analyzed in terms of cost and effectiveness, with
the other components receiving only a cost analysis.
Indeed, training has often been regarded as the only
peace-time mission the Army has, and therefore costed in
a wholly superficial manner. The Cost and Operational
Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) , an integral part of the
acquisition process, establishes rank orderings of
alternative hardware systems, however, the other four
components have not been integrated into that analysis.
With the formation of the Army's Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) in 1974, evaluation of the training
component of the weapon system acquisition process was
emphasized. The Cost and Training Effectiveness Analysis
(CTEA) is now a required document for all prospective
weapon systems. The CTEA focuses on parameters that
describe training performances and that are clearly related
to, ultimately, system performance and combat effectiveness.
This requires that a clear "audit trail" be identifiable
from the training environment to the combat application.
26

This requires that training be performance-oriented; that
is, the Army must train to perform those tasks required
in a combat engagement. This, of course, requires that
a system be thoroughly analyzed for accomplishment of a
7particular objective.
In this analysis the focus is on training effectiveness,
Alternative training methods are evaluated to determine the
extent to which each permits accomplishment of specific
goals or objectives. Typically, a minimum acceptable
performance level is determined (performance "floor")
.
This level is stated in terms of performance objectives,
which specify the tasks to be accomplished, the conditions
under which they must be accomplished, and the standards
which must be attained. Of course, the CTEA must recognize
the nature and locale of training as important consider-
ations as these factors materially impact on costs,
effectiveness, and system comparisons.
From World War II through the late 1960 's, the Army's
general model for training was institutionally based. The
cycle began in a basic training center and proceeded to a
service school which produced MOS-qualified personnel for
the units. Training in the units then focused on squad,
crew, team, and higher level unit skills. The result was a
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The premise underlying this concept was one of rapid mobili-
zation, whereby an individual arrived at his unit possessing
the individual skills learned in the service schools. The
unit, then, provided him the opportunity to practice those
skills in a team context.
While this system worked satisfactorily for over 25
years, several factors acted to necessitate a change during
the latter portion of the 1960 's. Perhaps the most
important was the extreme personnel turbulence that occurred
during the VietNam War. The twelve month rotation policy
caused turnover rates to soar. Accordingly, individuals
were afforded precious little stabilized time within a unit
to practice newly acquired skills. Additionally, the large
manpower requirements impacted adversely on the quantity
and quality of baseline expertise within the service schools
Also contributing to the requirement for a change was the
proliferation of equipment for any given MOS . The service
schools found themselves faced with the necessity of
preparing individuals to utilize several different models
of the same generic equipment. In addition to the sheer
increase in number of different models, the sophistication
of each new piece of equipment meant a higher level of
28

technical skill was required of both operator and mainten-
ance personnel.
These factors quickly pointed to the fact that the insti-
tutionally based system could not increase the training of
personnel at a rate that was commensurate with the rate of
increase in new weapons being fielded. Indeed, this
deficiency was noted during the fielding of the most basic
of Army weapons, the M-16 rifle. The Ichord Subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Committee noted, during an
investigation of the M-16's alleged deficiencies, "a lack
of adequate training on care and cleaning as a significant
o
deficiency of the weapon" in the hands of the troops.
In reaction to the deficiencies of the institutional
approach to training, the Army, in the early 1970 's,
introduced the concept of "decentralized training"
.
Basically this concept acknowledged that specific skills on
specific equipment must be taught at the unit level. That
is, the responsibility for a soldier's development of the
required level of proficiency on a piece of equipment was
that of his company and battalion commander. With the
shift in responsibility, higher command training guidance
in terms of specific training programs ceased.
In 1974, Headquarters, TRADOC directed each branch
school (i.e. infantry, artillery, etc.) to organize a
Director of Training Development which would, in effect.
29

become the "factory" that would export training to the
units in the field. This concept recognized that soldiers
spend 90% of their time in units, and that it is within
these units that he interfaces with specific equipment.
Each service school embarked on providing the units with
the same basic materials used in the schools. These
factories provided self-paced, exportable material to the
units so that service school expertise could be available
at the point of man-equipment interface. This system
enables an individual to transition through various models
of equipment without having to return to the service school
for training. Additionally, the availability of these
training packages enables unit commanders to provide
necessary training without establishing local schools that
are costly in terms of manpower, time, and equipment.
The result of this system is that, while service schools
remain the center of expertise for the various branches of
the Army, and continue to conduct advanced individual
training, it is recognized that they do not produce
experts on all models of equipment for any given MOS.
9Proficiency is a unit responsibility. Unit commanders
must now devote more time to insuring individual skills
are acquired at a sufficient level of proficiency to permit
the proper functioning of squads, crews, and teams. It is
obvious, therefore, that the introduction of a new weapon
30

system, or even a new model of an old system, involves
some degradation of performance until the unit commander
can conduct the skill training necessary to reacquire the
desired readiness level.
Army training is characterized by being either
individual or collective in nature. While the distinction
is not always readily apparent, individual training is
primarily concerned with preparing an individual to perform
tasks associated with a particular military occupational
specialty (MOS) . Methods of measuring training effective-
ness for individuals are widely documented, and the costs
associated with the training are maintained by TRADOC for
each MOS within the Army. The state of the art of both
costing and measuring effectiveness of collective or unit
training is a wholly different matter. This training
prepares groups of individuals (crews, teams, squads,
platoons, companies, etc.) to accomplish tasks as a single
entity.
Research in the area of collective training has been
on-going for over 20 years. Despite the relative
importance of the area, Glanzer and Glaser in 1955 noted
that very little formal knowledge existed concerning
methods of analyzing and measuring collective performance.
They cited the many complexities inherent in such training
as being the major stumbling block to effective analysis.
31

"In the investigation of the areas of team, as opposed
to individual, training and performance, problems appear
of an entirely new order of magnitude." Indeed, the Defense
Science Board stated in 1975, in addressing the difficulty
of team training research, that
This kind of R&D must be piggybacked
on operations in the field. Large
numbers of R&D personnel are required.
The opportunities for data collection
during the exercise are marginal,
inferential statistics and psychometrics
were not designed for this order of
complexity. There are limited opportun-
ities for repeated trials and the ultimate
test of team training is combat, which
cannot be simulated. '^
The Army is constantly reviewing and analyzing its
training methods. Analyses are conducted not only upon
introduction of a new weapon system, but also whenever
performance deficiencies occur, or when new technological
developments appear to have application for training
systems. The Army currently uses three basic types of
CTEA, each addressing a different training issue. They
are (1) Train-up Study (TUS)
, (2) Training Development
Study (TDS) , and (3) Training Analysis for COEA (TAG)
.
The TUS is a CTEA conducted to determine if a currently
existing performance deficiency can be reduced or eliminated
through a revised training program or whether a new
operational system is required. It is typically conducted
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when there is justifiable reason to believe that an
improved training system could materially reduce the force
deficiency. Additionally, such an analysis is used when an
interim training fix is required prior to the fielding of a
new operational system. Caution must be exercised to insure
that such analyses are not attempted for a system in which
training effectiveness has clearly been optimized. Such
studies are typically conducted by the service school
that is the proponent for the weapon system.
A TDS is conducted to evaluate and compare training
effectiveness, resources, costs, and cost benefits of
alternative training systems designed to meet current force
training deficiencies. The alternatives examined may
involve equipment, strategies, media techniques, or new
training technologies. The basic issue of a TDS, then,
is to compare alternative training approaches designed to
meet specific performance objectives. Most TDSs are
conducted in coordination with the Life Cycle Systems
Management model application to training system development.
While normally not involved with the acquisition process,
a TDS may be conducted to establish a baseline effectiveness
level against which proposed systems are compared.
Responsibility for conducting TDSs normally resides with a




A TAG is conducted in parallel with a material
acquisition process COEA. • Current policy is aimed at all
such analyses being conducted by the TRADOC Systems
Analysis Agency (TRASANA) . The TAG compares the training
costs, resources, and effectiveness of each alternative
training system for each weapon system under consideration.
These results are then integrated into the GOEA to present
a more complete picture of the alternatives involved. The
TAG effort is, of necessity, a forecast of the characteris-
tics of the training system necessary to train personnel
to the minimum proficiency levels which provide for attain-
ment of the performance objectives of the hardware. In
many instances the TAG will be used to analyze purely
conceptual weapon systems and systems in various stages of
hardware development. The complexity of the problem is
compounded by these constraints and increase the importance
of methodologies with which to deal with the multitude of
variables.
While the categories of GTEA are neatly defined, the
methodologies involved in the conduct of them are not.
Indeed, many Army agencies are in the throes of determining
what constitutes effective training. Performance criteria
that most GTEA must address are basic issues of military
training. These criteria include: initial acquisition
of a skill, which is basically a learning curve comparison
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of alternative methods; skill retention, which focuses on
minimizing forgetting; retraining, reacquisition of a
skill level previously learned; and training transfer,
comparison of the degree to which skills learned in training
transfer to achievement of performance objectives under
12
operational conditions. The last issue is perhaps the
most critical, for all training is for naught unless
transferable to operational performance.
The training effectiveness analysis phase of a CTEA is
conducted in two parts. The first part consists of
identifying those items of performance assessment that must
be collected for input into the CTEA. The measures of
training effectiveness (MOTE) must be selected very care-
fully, to insure that they provide the requisite data for
analysis. Ideally MOTE are measures, scores, or other
performance indices related to the task being performed.
However, some aspects of the analysis may require the
generation of MOTE using subjective data. While ideally
the use of subjective MOTE are minimized, current Army
tests and evaluations rely extensively on subjective analyses
of trainee performance. This results in a lack of standard-
ization which means that evaluations are extremely dependent
on the experience/ability of the evaluator. Part two of
the training effectiveness analysis involves the actual
conduct of the assessment. Critical to this part is the
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conduct of sensitivity analysis to assess the impact of
various parameters on the training effectiveness.
The cost phase of the analysis must be closely
coordinated with the effectiveness phase to insure that
cost estimates are valid and reliable. When conducting a
TAG, life-cycle cost estimates must be obtained. Personnel
costs are a large portion of the training costs, particularly
as part of total operating costs. Care must be taken to
insure that personnel costs associated with maintenance
are not overlooked. In that the system may very well be
conceptual, maintenance costs are a prime area for sensiti-
vity analysis. The changes in the operational aspects of
unit training costs brought about by the introduction of
the new system are a function of how the system compares
13
with the base case. Historically, the introduction of
more sophisticated systems indicates an increase in
manpower, training time, and/or grade structure. All costs
are categorized as research and development, investment
costs, or operational costs. Investment costs are defined
as all costs associated with producing and procuring
equipment, initial organization of personnel, and estab-
lishment of the new system. Such investment costs include
both recurring and nonrecurring expenditures. Operational
costs are limited to those expenditures required to utilize
a performance capability or to keep it operational during
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its intended life. The distinction here is important, for
it is within the category of nonrecurring investment costs
that this paper primarily focuses.
This overview of training analyses was presented to
indicate the methods currently available for analyzing
unit training, and to demonstrate that a system exists to
implement the methodology which will be described herein.
Indeed, the TAG is the study in which the problem of unit
training with new weapon systems must be addressed. Having
looked at these studies, an examination of the context in
which such analyses are conducted is in order. That is,
the type of unit training being conducted throughout the
Army must be considered. The next section describes the
training environment now prevailing.
C. CURRENT TRAINING TEGHNIQUES
In determining unit training effectiveness, the Army
agency responsible, TRADOG, devises training techniques
and tests designed to facilitate evaluation of a unit's
training status. The tests are used to determine, as
realistically as possible, the ability of the unit to
accomplish its stated missions. Most unit training in
the Army is based on information contained in ARTEP
publications. It is within these publications that the
tasks, conditions, and standards for each mission are
enumerated. A more detailed discussion of the ARTEP appears
at the end of this section.
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with the ARTEP as an outline, training managers are
provided considerable information with which to prepare
training scenarios to be used in conjunction with the
training techniques developed by TRADOC. Among the
techniques currently in use within the Army are SCOPES
(Squad Combat Operation Exercise, Simulation) , REALTRAIN
(Realistic Training) , MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser
Engagement System) , the CATTS (Combined Arms Tactical
14Training Simulator)
.
SCOPES is designed to teach movement techniques to
fire teams and squads. It employs a force on force scenario,
with each rifleman having a six-power telescope mounted
on his M-16. Additionally, each man wears an identifying
number on his helmet. When a number is identified by an
opposing soldier he calls out the number and fires a
blank round. Controllers then verify the number over the
controller radio net, and the soldier identified is "killed".
Engagements can thus be conducted wherein the outcome is a
direct result of the tactics and techniques employed. An
after-action review is held with a discussion of errors
made and lessons learned. To a large degree this training
technique keeps the subjectivity of the controllers from
influencing the outcome.
REALTRAIN permits the use of SCOPES techniques on a
larger scale. That is, by mounting telescopes on such
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crew-served weapons as TOW, DRAGON and 90inm recoilless
refles, engagements can be simulated for opposing forces
of platoon or possibly company size. Field tests conducted
to date indicate that such engagement simulation techniques
permit units to achieve high levels of tactical proficiency
more rapidly, while increasing individual soldier motivation
through a challenging tactical exercise.
MILES is presently an experimental group of training
devices scheduled to be tested in 1978. It employs an
eye-safe laser beam to simulate weapon effects and permits
the conduct of day and night exercises involving battalion
and task force size units. Hit indication devices mounted
on likely targets signal "kill" or "near miss". The use
of the MILES package permits improved integration of gunnery
techniques into tactical training.
The CATTS system, provides simulated combat situations
to commanders and their staffs operating from a ground
command post. The system employs a Xerox Sigma 9 Computer
which permits real-time ground combat simulation, realistic
mockups of command post vehicles, actual field radios for
communications, on-the-spot command decisions and
critiques, and extensive automation to assist controllers.
It is currently being used by students attending the Army's
Command and General Staff College.
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All of the systems discussed are designed to facilitate
unit training. As such, they are tied directly to the
tasks identified by the ARTEP as being critical to the
accomplishment of a unit's mission. The ARTEP is the current
standard against which all units are measured.
The basic missions that a type unit must perform are
determined by TRADOC, and the essential elements of
evaluation for each of these missions are contained in the
ARTEP literature that TRADOC publishes. The particular
ARTEP that a unit undergoes, that is, the scenario and
location of the various events , are determined by a head-
quarters two levels above that of the tested unit. Typic-
ally, the Division staff prepares and conducts the
evaluation of battalion-size units. Evaluators are provided
for every section of the battalion staff, for each company
within the battalion, for each mortar platoon in the rifle
companies, and for each special platoon/section found in
the combat support company (heavy mortars, reconaissance,
ground surveillance, anti-aircraft, and anti-tank) . These
evaluators are selected from within the Division, and
ideally have commanded a unit similar to the one being
evaluated. Evaluation teams consist of 4 0-50 men, and
as such are considerably expensive in terms of manpower.
Each battalion-size evaluation consumes approximately
three weeks of the evaluator's time with pre-test planning.
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conduct of test, and post-test critique and reporting.
Recognizing that a Division must conduct a minimum of
nine such tests annually (one for each line battalion) , it
is readily apparent that a full-time testing office within
the Division staff is necessary to coordinate the workload.
The test itself is conducted in two phases. During
the initial or small unit evaluation (SUE) phase, squads
from the rifle platoons in each company, mortar squads,
anti-tank sections, scout sections, ground surveillance
teams, and anti-aircraft teams are selected at random by
the evaluators and required to perform specific missions.
These tasks normally require from a few hours to 24 hours
to conduct. Phase 1 normally lasts two days. During
Phase II, the entire battalion deploys on a field exercise
and performs as a battalion those missions designated by
the evaluators. In addition to evaluating the ability
of the battalion to function as a cohesive unit during
this phase, platoons are also selected at random to conduct
independent operations and then return to battalion control.
This phase of the test normally lasts 3-4 days.
During the SUE phase, many of the required tasks lend
themselves to objective evaluation, such as number of hits
per weapon and elapsed time for the 12 mile road march.
However, nearly all tasks conducted during the battalion
deployment phase are evaluated on a subjective, "go-no go"
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basis. This leads to inconsistencies in scoring because
it places the burden of evaluation squarely on the profess-
ional judgment of the evaluator. Indeed, in the ARTEP
Validation Report conducted by the Army Research Institute
in 1974, it was concluded that the ARTEP, in its present
form, is not a standardized test instrument. The report
continued.
There is no reason to expect that
different teams would be evaluated
under the same conditions when using
ARTEP guidance and standards. The
standards are too subjective and
evaluator performance is too erratic.
There is no explanation of how to
relate task performance to over-all
mission performance or how to adjust
standards to account for varying test
conditions. -^^
Aircraft teams are selected at random by the evaluators
and required to perform specific missions. These tasks
normally require from a few hours to 24 hours to conduct.
At the conclusion of this phase, normally two days in
duration, the entire battalion deploys on a field exercise
and performs missions designated by the evaluators. In
addition to evaluating the ability of the battalion to
function as a cohesive unit, during this phase platoons
are selected at random to conduct independent operations
and then return to battalion control. This phase of the
test normally lasts 3-4 days.
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During the SUEs, many of the tasks lend themselves to
objective evaluations, such as number of hits per weapon and
elapsed time for the 12 mile road march. However, tasks
conducted during the battalion deployment phase are nearly
all evaluated on a subjective, "go-no go" basis. This
leads to inconsistencies in scoring and places the burden
of evaluation squarely on the professional judgment of the
evaluator. Indeed, in the ARTEP Validation Report conducted
by the Army Research Institute in 1974, it was concluded
that the ARTEP, in its present form, is not a standardized
test instrument. The report continued,
"There is no reason to expect that
different teams would be evaluated
under the same conditions when using
ARTEP guidance and standards. The
standards are too subjective and
evaluator performance is too erratic.
There is no explanation of how to
relate task performance to overall
mission performance or how to adjust
standards to account for varying test
conditions. "15
Despite these shortcomings, the ARTEP does establish
a performance floor that is' currently recognized by
Department of the Army as the minimum acceptable effective-
ness level. Detailed critiques are provided to commanders
by the evaluation team following the exercise. The contents
of this critique form the nucleus for unit training in the
ensuing months. It is the ability of the ARTEP to identify
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problem areas down to squad and team level that makes it
an attractive form of evaluation.
Illustration of how the foregoing discussion on training
analysis and training techniques impacts on the training
cost of a newly introduced weapon system will appear in
the next chapter. However, for clarity the TOW system is
described in the next section to permit the reader to view
the changes in unit training dictated by the system. The
following section also includes a discussion of a current
training evaluation which pointed out problems with the
system used for TOW training.
D. THE TOW WEAPON SYSTEM
The training techniques and concepts discussed are
designed to provide realism and aid the unit commander in
forging a combat ready force. Advancing technology has
required commanders to continuously analyze the traditional
concepts of tactical warfare as weaponry available to them
becomes increasingly sophisticated. Perhaps no weapon has
impacted as greatly on infantry tactics in the past thirty
years as has the TOW; a tube launched, optically tracked,
wire command linked guided missile system. The TOW is the
heavy anti-tank weapon of the Army and is capable of
delivering first round accurate fire against targets from
65 to 3000 meters. It is used to destroy formations of
armored vehicles, field fortifications, and emplacements.
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The TOW replaced the 106iTun Recoilless Rifle, and
its operation is simplified in comparison with earlier
systems. With an encased missile inserted in the launch
tube, the gunner performs only the following steps: (1)
visually selects a target, (2) aligns the optical sight on
the target by use of control knobs, and (3) while tracking
the target, presses the firing trigger. With the gunner
keeping the crosshairs centered on the target during flight,
the TOW missile is automatically guided to target impact.
Benefits of the TOW include reduction in gunner error
with the TOW guidance system, simplified gunner training,
and a greatly increased hit capability against moving
targets at all ranges between 65 and 3000 meters. Addition-
ally, the TOW launcher reduces weight over the 106mm rifle
from 460 to 171 pounds and increases the effective range
from 1100 to 3000 meters.
The TOW squad consists of a four man crew, a squad
leader, gunner, assistant gunner, and driver. The TOW can
be fired from a ground mounted position, or from a mount
on an armored personnel carrier or 1/4 ton truck (jeep)
.
Each of the three rifle companies in an infantry battalion
has two TOW squads, and the Anti-Tank Platoon of the Combat
Support Company has 12 squads. Thus the Battalion Commander
is faced with training and employing 18 TOW squads.
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In December, 1976 the United States Army Infantry School
conducted an evaluation of TOW training based on data
collected from units serving in Europe. The driving force
behind the evaluation was a concern that unit TOW training
programs were ineffective insofar as training the soldiers
to a level which would allow maximizing the capability of
the weapon on the modern battlefield. This evaluation was
conducted using a synergistic logic combining the total
weapon system (total weapon system = soldier + training +
weapon) and battlefield effectiveness (B = weapon x
proficiency x tactic/technique of employment) . The "weapon"
is constant in both formulae, soldier + training yields
proficiency, and tactic or technique of employment calls
both of the former together with current doctrine for
1
6
effective employment of the system. The study then
proceeded to examine the five major areas of a weapon
system: soldier, training, weapon, proficiency, and
tactics of employment.
The major finding of the evaluation was that TOW gunner
selection criteria was critical in improving the effective-
ness of the weapon. Indeed, the report states:
... training can be the 'fix' which
causes actual effectiveness to approach
designed effectiveness, but the link
between training and the weapon is the
man. The properly selected trainee may
be able to do more to 'fix' the gap than
an expensive but artificial and
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unwarranted change in the training
program. The bottom line, then, in
the case of sound training programs,
is that it may be cheaper, better,
quicker, and have all the external
benefits of placing a man in the job
he is suited for, if we properly-
select our TOW gunner trainees.
Proper trainee selection can close
the retention gap and give the trainee
the option of either doing more training
in less time or getting more proficiency
for a fixed amount of training time.
Obviously, once we place the correct
man in training we realize the economics
of reducing the retention gap regardless
of whether we opt for more training in
fixed time, same training in less time,
more proficiency in less time, or an
appropriate mix of these. -^^
This observation suggests that the Commander, in
addition to training TOW gunners and crews, must pay
particular attention to the selection of troops to fill
these key positions. With the reduction in institutional
training by the service schools, and the elimination of a
separate military occupational specialty for direct fire
crewman, the commander now is forced to select TOW crew
members from among his infantry riflemen. This screening
process, which had been conducted by training centers prior
to the shift in emphasis away from institutionalized
training, requires additional time and resources for the
unit commander, as the unit typically receives very few
school-trained crewmen. The nature of the TOW is such
that one cannot assume a crewman for the 106mm recoilless
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rifle will be a suitable TOW crewman. While the Infantry
School study suggests that gunner selection is the single
most critical variable, many units in Europe were found
to have no formal selection process, but rather a random
fill of vacant positions.
The study included interviews with over 4 00 men serving
in TOW positions from 12 different infantry battalions.
Not surprisingly, only 39% had received any formal TOW
training in a school exclusively for TOW outside the unit
environment. The study team administered a tactics test
to this population consisting of 12 questions concerning
employment of the TOW. The aggregate score on all questions
was a discomforting 52%. The study states, "Based on these
data, the only possible conclusion is that TOW units are
not tactically proficient with TOW insofar as knowing
and/or understanding basic tactics and techniques of
18
employment are concerned." This statement is made about
the most important single weapon to enter the Infantry's
inventory in 30 years 1 It is true that the introduction
of TOW has caused infantry leaders to rethink basic tactics.
The 3000 meters of range for direct fire is so alien to
infantry thinking that commanders are bewildered by the
myriad of possibilities it now affords them. No longer are
targets over 1000 meters out the problem of mortar and
artillery men along! This threefold increase in
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responsibility has necessitated a revamping of concepts
that has been slow in evolving.
To the extent that the Army has failed to train its
leaders in employing the TOW, has that failure been
transferred to TOW platoons and squads. An apparent
failure to recognize the impact of the introduction of TOW
on the battlefield has resulted in serious training
deficiencies throughout the Army. While the concept of
unit responsibility for training on specific weapons may
have some merit, to require such training when the unit
does not have the requisite expertise is folly. Battalion
and company commanders are and should be held accountable
for the training status of their units, however the Army
is accountable for providing the wherewithal to conduct
that training when new weapon systems are introduced. A
failure to do so is indicative of a lack of planning for
training and its concomitant costs during the acquisition
process. The result is that we have an inadequate number
of trained resources in TOW units in terms of technically
trained personnel and leader/trainers who are sufficiently
trained to train others. Only 41% of the leader/trainer
population is school trained, and only 21% of the individuals




This chapter has described the various analyses of
training currently ongoing within the Army in support
of weapon system acquisitions and modifications. Dis-
cussions of the ARTEP and current unit training techniques
being employed were included to provide the reader with a
notion of the increased complexity of unit training.
Additionally/ the TOW was described in some detail in an
effort to portray the impact of externalities in unit
training. Indeed, with weapon systems and training
techniques becoming increasingly sophisticated, the costs
associated with units becoming proficient with the new
systems will inevitably increase. While these costs do
not appear to be a significant portion of total life cycle
costs, they are significant costs at the division and
battalion levels and should therefore be estimated and
included in funding considerations. To impede training
because costs were not anticipated, and funds therefore
not available, is avoidable. In the next chapter an
examination of two models currently being studied by the
Army to estimate unit training costs is presented.
Additionally, the authors present their methodology for
estimating these costs using currently existing systems.
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IV. TRAINING COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will introduce those facets of training
which require- the use of resources and will discuss how
they apply to the problem addressed by this paper. After
this introduction, a discussion of the Training Management
Control System (TMCS) will develop the premise that current
inputs to that system can be used to develop cost estimates
to be used within the life cycle cost model for evaluating
competing weapon systems during development.
The research conducted for this thesis indicates that
there are currently two methods being used in an effort
to estimate training costs at the unit level. These two
methods are the National Training Center Model and the
Army Training Study approach. These methods are discussed
below to develop for the reader an appreciation of the
complexity of defining all of the true costs associated
with training in a unit. What will be further developed
is that while the full cost is necessary for inclusion
in the decision making process, it is nearly impossible
to derive by either approach. Conversations with members
of the National Training Center indicated that there are
eight (8) resources which must be addressed in determining
training costs. They are: (1) personnel, (2) land, (3)
fuel, (4) equipment, (5) facilities, (6) software, (7)




The Army Training Study Group, currently in session,
is looking at only two of these factors for estimating
training costs - money and personnel, plus the additional
resource of time.
The above approaches are not yet defined as Army policy
and there is no information as to whether either will
achieve that status. Therefore the reader is cautioned not
to draw any conclusions outside those drawn by the authors.
These two approaches are presented here to impact a sense
of the complexity of the issue: yet offer a rather simple
procedure to accomplish the estimate.
B. THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER MODEL
The National Training Center Model requires that an
industrial engineering type estimate be developed. That
is, cost estimates are made for each of the components of
a weapon system and then aggregated.
Input 1 is personnel. The personnel requirements for
a unit can be developed logically from the official Table
of Organization and Equipment. (TO&E) If there is no
approved TO&E for the type system, one must be developed.
Personnel cost estimates based on skill/grade changes as
determined by the conceptual employment of the weapon
system, can be used prior to the approval of a change in
the TO&E. The lack of an approved TO&E is expected under
the TRADOC policy of performing CTEA during the development
phase of a weapon system acquisition.
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Input 2 is land, or more precisely, training land.
Development of a cost estimate for this input requires
that the developer assess whether or not the units which
will eventually receive the weapon system possess, or have
access to, sufficient training land to allow the conduct of
meaningful training with the weapon system. Obviously, this
requires data concerning what units will receive the weapon
system, where they will be stationed when the weapon system
is issued, what training lands are at that location, and the
cost of obtaining additional land if required. Training
Circular (TC) 25-1 (draft) from TRA.DOC presents a very
thorough evaluation of the importance of training land needs
for a modern army. It further analyzes what effectiveness
could be gained by developing a National Training Area with
sufficient land to train with all weapon systems.
Input 3 is fuel (POL) . Considering the complexities
of other inputs, this one is rather straightforward. Using
the conceptual or specified range characteristics, the
consumable expenditure can be directly computed parametri-
cally. This particular input need not be limited to POL,
but could easily be extended to all consumables such as
repair parts by use of the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)
characteristics of the weapon system. Actually, this
extension to repair parts may prove to be extremely valuable,
in that an impact on projected training time may be found
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by way of the amount of repair time required or the
operationally ready time on the weapon system.
Input 4 is equipment. An estimate for the cost of
equipment can generally be derived from current budgets.
This will be the cost of equipment used in support of
training, both by the unit and by its support units. These
estimates will be similar to those for fuel in that time
and some type of MTBF calculation must be determined.
Input 5, facilities, is another difficult resource to
assess. Like land, this estimate requires data on units
to receive the weapon system and their location when they
receive it, along with a facilities evaluation of that
location. Facilities are defined to include storage,
maintenance, training, and security facilities depending
on the weapon system requirements.
Input 6, software, refers to those support requirements
other than hardware specified in the list of inputs.
This could include the use of trainers, training systems
which are computer-assisted or use some other software
system either directly involved in the weapon system or
in support of it at a base level.
Input 7 is ammunition requirements, which can be
estimated from the training system specifications being
developed for the weapon system.
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Input 8, money, refers to any direct budgetry impacts
which would result from the introduction of a weapon
system. Of interest would be such things as the projected
cost of transporting the system, sending personnel on
temporary duty for training as instructors, having to add
to the civilian labor force to support the weapon system,
or the requirement for additional training money for
elements not addressed above.
As can be seen from the presentation of this model,
a "bottom-up" estimate for the costs of re-establishing
a unit's readiness following the introduction of a weapon
system can be developed, i.e. training costs = 1+2+3+4, etc,
This aggregation will be based, in part, on parametric
estimates which are functions of the weapon system's
particular characteristics such as range, MTBF, operating
hours, etc. To amplify further, some of the eight input
costs will be affected in a nonlinear fashion due to the
weapon characteristics. For example, the increase in the
range of the TOW over the 106mm recoilless rifle was
nearly three times, but the land required for training was
greater than just the multiple of three because of greater
safety requirements at the longer ranges. This added
factor presents a formidable task for any cost analyst to
be able to present a meaningful estimate, especially during
the development stage of a weapon system.
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C. THE ARMY TRAINING STUDY APPROACH
This approach more nearly fits the description of a
parametric cost estimate. Using the three factors of time,
money, and personnel, costs are estimated as a function of
their interrelationships. However, this approach is not
numerically definitive, but rather is descriptive in nature,
The development of this approach corresponds to the
varying emphasis upon each factor as the organizational
level involved is changed. That is, a company conducting
unit training is most concerned with time as a constraint,
as the company commander has little control over the amount
of money provided his unit and little control over the
personnel assigned. At the battalion level, the next level
of aggregation in the hierarchy, the emphasis appears to
change. While the battalion commander does have more
influence on money allotted to his command, his influence
is still very constrained. His concern about time becomes
that of scheduling facilities rather than time to conduct
specific tasks. Therefore, the primary concern becomes
that of personnel. His influence over this resource is
relatively greater than over time or money, which means
cost estimates from this level will emphasize the personnel
aspect to a greater degree.
The emphasis on personnel continues to the division
level, approximately. From above the division level to
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the Secretary of Defense level the key resource becomes
money. Time has no meaning at this level of program
management, and personnel are relatively unimportant in
that the structure of the forces is usually exogenous to
any program considerations. Therefore, any estimate will
be driven primarily by budgetary considerations.
The problem with this approach becomes one of tying
the different viewpoints into a recognizable and acceptable
estimate of the costs. Basically the estimate will be:
(1) training = time available at the company level,
(2) training = time facilities are available + qualifications
of personnel + skill/grade authorizations
versus actual assigned at the battalion/
division,
(3) training = money at Army/DOD level.
Attempts to use this method to estimate costs early in
the development phase would be unreasonable.
D. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
The key point which must be kept in mind in any concept
or methodology employed is that the objective is to estimate
the cost of returning a unit to a specified level of
readiness after a weapon system has been operationally
deployed with that unit. The problem is that there is
currently no linkage which provides a means of calculating
training requirements relative to readiness requirements.
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While the National Training Center and Army Training
Study approaches described shed some light on the problem,
they do not provide a means of reaching the above objective.
They do provide more insight than does the life cycle cost
model, although these aspects could be added to LCC under
appropriate cost elements. The current life cycle cost
structure does not account for these costs in the correct
place. The additional cost of re-establishing unit read-
iness levels should be a category under operating and
support costs. A methodology for development of these
costs is presented in the next section.
The current elements in the operating and support
category are shown at Figure 4 . As can be seen from the
preceding figures (2 and 3) , there are cost elements under
Research and Development and under Investment which have
labels indicating content similar to those discussed.
The costs included in the Research and Development
categories of Training and Facilities are not the same as
discussed herein. (Fig. 2) Included in Training are
those costs associated with design, development, and
production of prototype training devices; and the cost of
training service test crews and maintenance personnel. The
Facilities element includes costs associated with facilities
required to be acquired or converted for use in the
development and testing of the weapon system.
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The Investment elements (Fig. 3) related to training
include the costs of design, development and production
of training equipment and the cost of training service
instructors and initial crew and maintenance personnel.
The costs of training replacement personnel is excluded
here to be collected under Operating and Support costs.
The operational/site activation element would be appropriate
for including the costs of providing adequate facilities
for units receiving the weapon system.
The discussion above indicates that the current
system does provide a means for categorizing the training
cost data required to develop Life Cycle costs for a
weapon system. What is needed is the ability to determine
the cost of unit training necessitated by reduction in unit
readiness that occurs when a new weapon system is deployed.
The following section offers a methodology for addressing
this situation.
E. TRAINING MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
The Army has traditionally had difficulties in quanti-
fying the costs associated with unit training. Commanders
have been required to plan extensive training programs
based on wholly insufficient data pertaining to the cost
of the programs. Additionally, the Army has experienced
significant difficulties in justifying funds for training
before Congressional committees. This has been largely
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due to the fact that the Army has been unable to provide
sufficient data to the committees concerning the cost of
the training desired, and the benefits to be derived from
the training. That is, the task is one of developing a
system Which expresses what we are buying rather than one
which merely identifies what we are paying for. The Navy
has been able to rely on "steaming days" as a measure of
costs and benefits of training funds; and the Air Force uses
"flying hours" in the same manner. Unfortunately the Army's
training does not fit into such neat, concise packages.
Accordingly, after the funds have been allocated, the Army
may not have received what it considered it "fair share",
but is unable to argue the point logically.
The fact is not new that budget cuts are frequently
mistaken as "savings" generated by efficiencies, rather
than being recognized as the program cuts for which they
are. In his book. Program Budgeting: Theory and Practice
,
Dr. Frederick C. Mosher offers the following:
"... a very large part of the economy
reductions in, for example, the Army
appropriations, actually come out of
a program rather than out of economics
in the execution of the program. This
fact may be disguised to some extent
by retaining the basic program but putting
off to future years its accomplishment,
such as President Truman's determination
in his 'stretchout'. Or it may be
concealed in the Budget Bureau's or
the Congress' substitution of their
judgment for the military department
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judgment as to what is needed . .
.
But in the vast majority of cases, what
is reduced is what is bought and done;
it is at least doubtful that reductions
usually result in the buying and doing
of the same things at less cost."
Adding to the problem of resource justification to both
OSD and the Congress are the historical precedents established
by the Army. OSD and the Congress have observed significant
fluctuations in the amount of resources provided to major
commands with no reported change in their training proficiency,
The Army announces that the majority of its units are rated
training ready, by its own definition, and yet continues
to state requirements for additional resources to improve
the training readiness of those units. It is not difficult
to understand the difficulty opponents have in accepting
this paradox. The Army would be on much firmer ground when
requesting additional training resources if some increased
output or a manifestation of the return on the investment
of the additional resources could be exhibited. The same
reasoning applies when developing training requirements and
costs for new weapon systems.
In 1977 the Vice Chief of Staff directed FORSCOM to
identify the cost of field training and quantify that cost
in terms of Battalion Field Training Days (BFTD) . A BFTD
is defined as 8-24 hours of mission related training
conducted by a battalion with sufficient personnel and
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equipment to accomplish its training task outside its
assigned billeting, administrative/ and logistical areas.
For example, a battalion ARTEP training event of 10 hours
duration would be reported as one BFTD. Company and platoon
field training would be reported proportionally. In a
battalion of five companies with four platoons each, a company
field training day would be reported as 1/5 BFTD, and a
platoon field training day would equal 1/20 BFTD. The BFTD
is to become the Army's "steaming days" and "flying hours",
and as such is the Army's proxy for combat effectiveness.
It is foreseen that budget justification will be facilitated
by the Army's exhibiting an ability to quantify the amount
of training purchased with specific funding levels.
Additionally, the system would provide an important manage-
ment tool for battalion, brigade, and division commanders
by enabling them to determine the training program that
maximizes the use of available resources.
Charged with this responsibility, FORSCOM has developed
the Training Management Control System (TMCS) , designed
to provide commanders with sufficient data concerning the
cost of training so that realistic annual training programs
20
can be developed. Additionally, the system permits a
separation of training funds to sustain active units in the
mission funding account. This ability to accurately depict
the funds needed for training alone will greatly facilitate
justification of requests and expenditures.
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There are several collateral benefits realized from
this system. It has necessitated the development of valid
equipment operating cost factors. Such factors will enable
the Army to accurately charge for use of its equipment in
support of outside activities, much as the Air Force charges
for the use of its aircraft. A traditional source of
difficulty has been forecasting ammunition requirements
necessary to support annual training programs. An inability
to predict the types of exercises that would be conducted
has been a major obstacle to accurate forecasting. TMCS
eliminates much of the guesswork involved in this process
by enumerating the field training to be conducted and also
permits updating of requirements as the training program is
modified. The assignment of training areas has been
simplified. TMCS identifies the acreage needed for given
types of tactical maneuvers and thereby reduces the chances
of training areas being improperly proportioned to accom-
modate unit exercises. Land availability has become an
increasingly significant problem as weapon systems with
greater ranges enter the inventory. Additionally, the
extensive manual recording efforts necessary to maintain
battalion level data concerning dollars and POL consumed
is eliminated with TMCS. The battalion commander now has
data readily available indicating the resources remaining
with which to conduct his training program.
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The TMCS operates with minicomputers located in the
Division and Brigade headquarters. It is essentially a
linear program which maximizes the number of battalion
field training days available for a given set of tactical
exercises, subject to constraints on funds, space, time,
flying hours, ammunition, and POL. Linearity of the
objective function was assumed, and through testing conducted
thus far appears to be appropriate.
Input forms and output generated by the system are
shown in Figures 5-8. Figure 5 contains information
provided by each battalion, for each event (i.e. attack,
defense, etc.) it desires to conduct during the forth-
coming fiscal year. The data includes unit size, number
of personnel participating, duration of the exercise,
physical size of the area required, and a listing of
equipment and ammunition to be used. This data is entered
in the model along with the constraints shown at the top
of Figure 6. The model then generates the number of
BFTD-equivalents each event represents, as shown in the
lower section of Figure 6. Having done this, the model
then provides for each battalion, by event, the training
that can and cannot be conducted under the given constraints
as shown in Figure 7. The top portion of that figure
depicts each training event that can be conducted, and
the quantity of each resource required to execute it.
67

The lower portion depicts that training that cannot be
conducted due to insufficient quantities of one or more
resources. The model then makes available to the Division
Commander the information shown in Figure 8 . This depicts
aggregate training, in terms of BFTDs, that each of his
units can conduct under existing constraints. Additionally,
he is provided with the total fixed (garrison) and variable
costs associated with each unit's training.
Armed with this information, zero based budget develop-
ment and justification is greatly enhanced. Having
quantified data for total field training resources required
permits the Division Commander to prepare contingency train-
ing plans for various funding levels. TMCS also provides
a Division allocation of dollars, POL, flying hours, and
maneuver areas to the battalion; it provides the Division
with ammunition requirements by type in both rounds and
dollars; provides each an automated update capability;
provides equipment, ammunition, and maneuver area require-
ments by training event as well as dollars, POL, and
flying hours to conduct each event; identifies training
which can and cannot be conducted and resources estimates
associated with each; and it provides the data with which
to develop an automated range and maneuver area scheduling
subsystem based on battalion annual training programs.
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Figiire 8 (continued)

The TMCS was tested in the 4th Infantry Division
(Mechanized) at Ft. Carson, Colorado in the fall of 1977
and proved successful. Additional testing is planned in an
effort to validate the equipment operating cost factors and
the garrison cost estimating techniques. While it is not
certain when this system will be available Army-wide, the
advantages of the system seem clear. The commander will,
at last, have quantifiable requirements to present in
support of requested funding rather than his subjective
analysis of the resources required and impact of various
funding levels on his training plan.
It would appear, however, that the TMCS may have
applications beyond those recognized at this time.
Specifically, the TMCS may be of value in estimating training
costs associated with new weapon systems. That is, during
the development phase of the acquisition process, after the
CTEA has been conducted and the operating cost factors have
been determined for the new item of equipment, and after a
doctrine for employment has been developed, estimates of
additional training events required can be entered into
TMCS and a new cost arrived at for annual training of
battalions receiving the new equipment. Normally this new
figure will be higher than the battalion's previous
training cost estimate, and this incremental difference is
attributable to the costs incurred in becoming combat ready
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with this new equipment. This figure can then be mul-
tiplied by the number of battalions Army-wide that will
receive this equipment, and the resulting figure added to
the life cycle cost estimate. When the equipment in
question is issued to all infantry battalions, for example,
the figure can be quite substantial for a 16 division force.
This cost difference should be recognized as a non-recurring
cost in that once a unit has achieved the desired readiness
level with a piece of equipment, the costs associated with
maintaining that level should be less, and in fact approach
a constant figure for the ensuing years. If, however, this
constant level is higher than the previous weapon system
required, then the incremental recurring cost should also
be included in the life cycle cost.
The adoption of this system would provide the Division
Commander with a sound cost estimate for the training funds
required in the year in which he is to receive the new
equipment. Presently he must operate with funds based on
current unit configuration, and training costs associated
with new equipment must be absorbed within the existing
OMA budget. Recognizing that a degradation of readiness
is unacceptable, funding realities therefore dictate that
cuts in other areas be made due to these unprogrammed
training exigencies. Improved cost estimating and
corresponding budgeting will enable unit commanders to avoid
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this method of operating. The additional BFTDs generated
by new equipment will be calculated by TMCS and provide
justification for increased funding. It will be a fairly
simple task to show the amount of training that can be
accomplished with given funding levels for the new weapon
system. That is, the training cost to achieve a given
readiness level, i.e. to successfully complete an ARTEP,
will be readily identifiable. While there is subjectivity
involved in arriving at the number of additional BFTDs
required to achieve a desired readiness level with a new
weapon system, the initial estimate can be refined through
results obtained from the operational tests conducted during
the development phase. As the weapon system is issued to
operational units and data on training results become
available the training estimate can be further updated.
By definition, BFTDs communicate time requirements
associated with training events necessary for achieving
a given level of unit readiness. For battalions of a
given type (Armor, Mechanized Infantry, Field Artillery,
etc.) and with the same training readiness mission, the
requirements in terms of BFTDs would be relatively the same.
Therefore, an Army-wide composite BFTD requirement could
be developed for the new weapon system by taking a weighted




This technique, however, does not address dollar
resources which are the primary concern of OSD and Congress.
Therefore, to be a useful tool for relating the unit
training readiness requirements to dollars, BFTDs must be
convertible to dollar requirements.
The cost of unit training is dependent on the type
of training event undertaken more than the time required
to perform it. This is clear from Figure 8, where one
finds the variable cost of training for the 1/lOth
Mechanized Infantry battalion to be $216,215 for 152 BFTDs,
or about $1422 per BFTD. Meanwhile, the 1/llth Mechanized
Infantry battalion is spending $280,777 for 94 BFTDs or
approximately $2987 per BFTD. In that these units are
exactly the same in terms of configuration and readiness
requirements, the large cost difference must be attributable
to the type of exercises being conducted. Clearly, a
mechanized attack requires more fuel than does a static
defense. At battalion level and lower there is little
relationship between BFTDs and costs. For example, a
training event may require 0.2 BFTD and cost $1000, while
another training event may require 1.0 BFTD and cost only
$400. A methodology for dealing with this is to express
each training event based on its cost as a multiple of a
baseline BFTD cost. That is, the baseline BFTD cost would
be the average cost of BFTDs required to conduct training
77

on a battalion-wide basis. For example, if the baseline
cost for a mechanized infantry BFTD were $1000, a platoon
event costing $300 would equate to 0.3 BFTD, regardless of
the time involved. The battalion's total additional
training requirement would be the sum of all individual
events expressed in baseline BFTDs of $1000 per day.
The cost of a BFTD would be type battalion dependent.
That is, an armor BFTD would be more costly than an infantry
BFTD. From Figure 8 one finds the 2/34 th Armor battalion
spending $581,890 for 82 BFTDs, or $7096 per BFTD. This is
nearly five times the cost per BFTD for the 1/lOth
Mechanized Infantry. However, an Army-wide BFTD cost could
be computed, once again, by taking a weighted average of
the BFTD costs for the various battalion types receiving the
new weapon system.
Using the data from Fort Carson at Figure 8, an
example will serve to highlight the order of magnitude of
the costs involved. Assume a new weapon system has been
received, and it has been determined that 14 BFTDs are
required for a unit to return to its previous readiness
level after receipt of the weapon. Further, assume that
the weapon system is issued to all infantry and armor
battalions. From Figure 8 one finds that the average cost
of a mechanized infantry BFTD is $1688, and an armor BFTD
costs $6498. With five mechanized infantry and four armor
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battalions, the cost of these 14 BFTDs is $482,048. That
is, the Division Commander is faced with nearly one-half
million dollars in training costs merely because he received
the new weapon system. All he can purchase with that money
is a return to his previous readiness level.
To restate, the current system provides no means by
which the additional training resources for the introduction
of a new weapon system and its concomitant effect on read-
iness can be recognized. To overcome this deficiency there
must be a single point within the Army force structure,
i.e. FORSCOM, which can control both the rate at which new
weapon systems are introduced and also provide, through
proper budgeting, the recognition of additional training
resource requirements for those new systems.
The methodologies discussed in this section provide
for two levels of aggregation. The first permits unit
commanders to prepare improved budgets for unit training
and thus avoid having to make difficult trade-off decisions
when unanticipated training requirements associated with new
weapon systems appear. The second affords the Army the
ability to quantify unit training requirements and to





V. THE TOW WEAPON SYSTEM AND THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION
A. INTRODUCTION
The use of the TOW as an example did not involve a
careful analysis by the authors of the many weapon systems
currently in the arsenal. The TOW was selected because the
nearest Army division/ the 7th Infantry Division at Ft. Ord,
California, was in the process of receiving its initial
issue of the TOW during the research phase of this paper,
and thereby provided a convenient case in point.
It is a particularly good weapon system for an analysis
of unit training costs. Indeed, the TOW was used to a
limited degree in Viet Nam, and has been in the hands of
troops in Western Europe for nearly ten years. CONUS
divisions have received the TOW in the last five years, and
the 7th Division, the 5th Division at Ft. Polk, Louisiana,
and the 24th Division at Ft. Stewart, Georgia all were
formed in 1974 and have been receiving the weapon system
during the past three years. It is apparent, then, that the
Army does have considerable experience in issuing the TOW
to combat divisions and for that reason it is an interesting
example of the Army's progress and implementation of lessons
learned during that period. While one would expect that
problems encountered in training and funding associated
with that training would have been documentated and
disseminated to units anticipating receipt of the weapon
system, apparently such is not the case.
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B. THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Formed in 1974, the 7th Infantry Division consists of
two active duty infantry brigades and a "round out" brigade
of the Oregon National Guard. It is one of only two light
infantry divisions in the active Army, the other being the
9th Infantry Division at Ft. Lewis, Washington. With the
activation of three new divisions in the same time frame
(5th, 7th, 24th) , a shortfall in weapon systems available
for issue to these divisions resulted. Indeed, not all of
the 13 divisions on the Army's rolls in 1974 had received
the TOW. Accordingly, the 7th Division was initially
equipped with the 106mm recoilless rifle as its heavy
anti-tank weapon. Trained crewmen for that weapon were
readily available in that it has been in the inventory for
many years, and a separate MOS existed for it thereby
relieving the units from individual training requirements.
Consequently, anti-tank platoons were formed, and battalion
tactics were based on having an anti-tank weapon system
with a maximum effective range of 1100 meters. Battalion
commanders then set about the arduous task of molding a
combat ready force. It should be noted here that the table
of organization and equipment the 7th Division was operating
under provided for no 106mm recoilless rifle in the
companies, all such weapons were in the battalion's anti-
tank platoon located in the Combat Support Company.
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They were essentially the battalion commander's anti-tank
weapons, employed by him based on recommendations from the
anti-tank platoon leader and the Combat Support Company
commander
,
Collocated with the 7th Division at Fort Ord is the
Combat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC) . This
organization conducts experiments for the Army concerning
weapon systems, tactics, doctrine, etc. In June, 1976
CDEC was conducting tests with the TOW, and inquired of the
7th Division as to the desirability of their providing
troops in support of the test. The 7th recognized the
opportunity to gain TOW experience for a few troops and
provided two 2 6-man anti-tank platoons to CDEC for the
testing. At the time the 7th Division knew they would be
receiving the TOW but did not know specifically the time
frame in which they would arrive. Accordingly, the two
platoons received two weeks of training on the TOW,
essentially at no cost to the 7th Division in that all
support was provided by CDEC. As events developed, the
first increment of TOWs did not arrive until January, 1977,
and with the 7th Division experiencing a personnel turnover
rate of approximately 20%, only about 40 of the individuals
that received this training were still in the division when
the initial TOWs arrived.
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In November, 1976/ having been notified that the first
TOW shipment would arrive in January, the 7th Division
sent 30 individuals to Fort Benning, Georgis for three
weeks to receive instruction on the TOW. This group
consisted primarily of noncommissioned officers from anti-
tank platoons throughout the division. This was to be the
nucleus of trained instructors who would provide TOW
instruction in the division. The cost to the 7th Division
associated with sending this contingent to Ft. Benning for
21three weeks was $14,451. With six infantry battalions m
the division, this training provided only five school-
trained TOW crewmen per battalion.
In January, 1977 the 7th Division received its first
increment of 36 TOWS. This enabled them to fully equip
two battalions. At the same time the Division TOW school
was established. It was conducted at Brigade level and
required seven military instructors and two civilians to
operate. The school was of one week's duration and
consisted primarily of instruction on the TOW's capabilities,
operation, and maintenance. The 4 hour course included two
hours of instruction on enemy armor identification and
tactics, and one-half hour on preparation of range cards, a
diagram of the defensive sector prepared by each fighting
position. These two blocks were the only ones in which
tactics were even obliquely discussed. No instruction was
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presented by the school concerning the doctrine for employing
the TOW in the various tactical maneuvers. Such instruction
was, presumably, left in the hands of the unit. In that the
introduction of the TOW required a reorganization within
each battalion (TOWs became organic to each rifle company
whereas the 106RR was not) , and required a significant
revision in tactics, it is unfortunate that the TOW crews
did not receive more instruction of a tactical nature.
Perhaps the reason is that until battalions and their
commanders had an opportunity to experiment with various
methods of employment in a field environment, the employment
principles were uncertain. Indeed, doctrine for a light
infantry division facing an armor threat is tenuous at best.
In the unit one finds the non-commissioned officers
that attended the school at Ft. Benning providing the
instruction. While they were knowledgeable concerning the
employment of the TOW itself in a given tactical role, their
experience and schooling does not provide them with an over-
view of how the TOW interacts with the other weapon systems
in the battalion and its impact on the overall doctrine for
employment of the battalion. Indeed, such knowledge should
reside with the officers in the battalion, the battalion
commander and company commanders. The battalion commander,
typically, is a graduate of the Command and General Staff
College, where discussion is on a somewhat grander scale
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than the tactical employment of an infantry battalion.
The company commanders may be graduates of the Infantry
Officer's Advanced Course, in which case they will have
been exposed to the doctrine of TOW employment. Experience
has shown, however, that at least one, and maybe more, of
the company commanders have not attended the Advanced Course
prior to assuming command. Accordingly, a need exists for
doctrinal instruction on employment for the officers. Given
the experience with TOW present in the Army in 1977, it
would appear that a training team (perhaps only one or two
TOW-exper'ienced officers) could have been made available to
present instruction on employment tactics and techniques to
the officers of the 7th Division. The problem in the 7th
Division was somewhat compounded in that the training
materials published by TRADOC discuss TOW employment by
mechanized and armor units. No manual existed for TOW
employment by light infantry units such as the 7th Division.
A battalion is faced, then, with returning to its
previous level of combat readiness armed with this new
weapon. The only way to accomplish this is to conduct
field training exercises and determine what problems are
encountered in employing the TOW in various offensive,
defensive, and retrograde maneuvers. Such problems as site
selection, command and control, general or direct support
roles, cover and concealment, determining kill zones, fire
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control, logistics support, and many others all need to be
addressed by the battalion and a determination made as to
the standard operating procedures (SOP) that can be developed
to solve these problems. Many problems do not lend them-
selves to being resolved by SOP, but must be addressed in
situational environments. These types of problems must be
identified and discussed so that the company commanders are
made aware of the tactical philosophy of the battalion
commander and their expected responses to problems of this
nature. Overlying all of these particular details of
employment is the larger question of the impact that the TOW
has on the employment of the remainder of the battalion.
That is, the increased range available to the commander
requires a re-evaluation of the tactical principles with
which he is familiar. For example, a major mission of rifle
platoons now becomes one of protecting the TOWs. The
survivability of a light infantry battalion facing an armor
threat depends, to a large degree, on the survival of the
TOWs. Therefore the commander must use maneuver elements
to provide security for those weapons, a nontraditional
role for infantry maneuver elements.
C. A BATTALION EXAMPLE
That was the problem facing the 3d Battalion, 17th
Infantry on 6 December 1977 when they received their TOW
weapon systems. The 3/17 Infantry was one of the last two
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battalions in the 7th Division to receive the TOW. On
6 December the Anti-Tank Platoon of the 3/17th Infantry
had no TOW trained personnel assigned to it, nor did any of
the TOW sections in the rifle companies. The Anti-Tank
Plantoon did have three non-commissioned officers assigned
who had served in Europe and had therefore gained experience
on the job with the TOW. In January, 1978 the battalion
received a quota for the TOW school at Ft. Benning and sent
their Anti-Tank Platoon leader. During January they received
four personnel from Advanced Individual Training who had
received TOW gunner training. Therefore, upon deployment
to Ft. Irwin, California for a three week field training
exercise, the battalion had 8 individuals with TOW
training/experience of the 74 assigned to TOW positions.
There are 7 8 total TOW positions authorized in the battalion.
Only one of the company commanders was a graduate of the
Advanced Course.
Upon the Battalion's return from Ft. Irwin, the authors
22interviewed the Battalion Commander . The role of the
3/17th Infantry in the FTX had been purely in a static
defense. Accordingly, the gunners received valuable tracking
experience, but the battalion had no opportunity to maneuver.
Additionally, the FTX was conducted on a Brigade level, and
the battalion was therefore somewhat constrained in the
type of training conducted. When asked how long, under then
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foreseeable conditions, it would be until the 3/17th Infantry
would return to a combat ready status equipped with the
TOWs, the Battalion Commander replied, three months. That
would bring the total elapsed time from receipt of the
weapon system to a combat ready status of approximately
5 1/2 months.
The authors then asked the Battalion Commander to
estimate the time required to reach a combat ready status
if the battalion could deploy to the field and have no
distractions from the training tasks. His reply at this
point was four weeks. He was then asked to estimate the
time required under the same conditions if the battalion
had kept the 106RR as its heavy anti-tank weapon. His reply
was two weeks. Incrementally, then, there is a 14 day
period of intensive training required for the battalion
caused by the introduction of the TOW. It should be noted
that the battalion commander had served in a sister
battalion as both the operations officer and executive
officer immediately prior to assuming command of the 3/17th
Infantry. Having had these varied perspectives, his
estimate is as valid as any that could be arrived at.
Costing this estimate with average figures generated by the
TMCS for the Ft. Carson test, one finds a transition cost
of approximately $26,2.75 for this battalion. In that the
3/17th Infantry is probably typical, this represents a cost
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to the Division of $236,475 for the nine battalions
receiving the TOW (three of which are National Guard
battalions) . In that the O&M budget for the 7th Division
was approximately $18 million in FY77, this represents 1.3%
of its total mission funding I Extrapolation of this data for
a 16 division Army leads to transition costs of over $3.7
million, or 1.8% of all operating funds spent in support
of the TOW from FY7 to FY7 7.
It is important to remember that none of the costs
discussed in this chapter were anticipated, indeed most were
not even recognized. While several of the problems identi-
fied in the 7th Division were not directly associated with
funding, a recognition of the problems experienced in
returning a unit to a combat ready status after deployment
of a new weapon system is the first step in solving many of
them.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
What has been presented to this point is an examination
of the current system for determining costs of a new weapon
system, a revelation of the cost of re-establishing read-
iness levels for a unit subsequently equipped with that
system, and a possible means to incorporate this estimated
cost into the decision-making process so that it may be
considered prior to committing the Army to procurement and
deployment of the weapon system.
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As examined in the first chapter, the Army today is
continuing to- place great emphasis on training and its
relationship to readiness. That is not surprising, in that
the Congress funds the Army for training which must be
converted to a measure of readiness in some manner. The
current economic environment dictates a policy of achieving
a combat level of readiness subject to a given budget, or
stated another way, maximum training effectiveness subject
to a budget constraint. To resolve this problem close
scrutiny of training effectiveness relative to combat
effectiveness is being conducted by study groups within the
Army.
The authors conclude that the current life cycle cost
model does not make provision for a cost element which
recognizes the costs of unit training. This omission is
more significant in view of current events which place
greater emphasis and reliance on individual training
conducted by the units of the Army as opposed to the
institutional training of individuals prior to their
arrival in the units. The absence of a cost element in the
LCC model precludes budget recognition of such costs by
FORSCOM. Commanders receiving new weapon systems are not
alerted to the increased costs generated by receipt of those




As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, no direct cost
estimating relationships have been developed by the Army for
combat effectiveness due to an inability to measure output
at the present time. To overcome this obstacle in developing
cost estimates of training, an indirect relationship must
be established. The authors recommend using battalion field
training days as a proxy variable for combat effectiveness
and development of an indirect cost estimating relationship
by that means. By so doing, analysis of resource use and
budget constraints may then proceed on an orderly basis.
To illustrate the logic of developing a cost estimating
relationship for training refer to Figure 9. The matrix
shows four categories of costs which must be addressed.
Each category will have different factors which will produce
the most significant cost change. The form of the relation-
ships are thought to be such that:
I. Direct Recurring Cost = f(# of units receiving the
weapon system, # of personnel per system requiring
unit training, time required to qualify, turnover
rate of qualified personnel) . Exactly what mathematical
relationship exists cannot be identified due to the
diverse nature of weapon systems.
II. Direct Non-Recurring Costs = f (# of acres of land
required for training on the system in excess of












support equipments necessary to support training
at each installation, i.e. targets, range facilities)
.
III. Indirect Recurring Costs = f (new tactics required
for employment of the weapon system which would
be taught to all personnel in a unit, personnel
turnover, other significant changes which occur
periodically)
.
IV. Indirect Non-Recurring Costs = f (new tactics as
they require one-time training for the entire unit,
special weapon system characteristics which require
one-time adjustment of support elements)
.
The above example is not extended to be an exhaustive
treatment of the training costs associated with re-establish-
ing readiness levels for a unit. It is merely intended to
protray how the segments of training costs; recurring vs.
non-recurring and indirect vs. direct; are driven by
weapon system characteristics and how complex the inter-
dependencies of these characteristics and costs can become.
For that reason the Army's life cycle cost model fails to
provide complete cost estimating. Another point which can
be made is that life cycle costing may not recognize these
training costs because the various personnel policies are
established at a higher level. The reality is that these
policies must be considered and analyzed in completing a
training analysis as the ability to have an effect on
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retention and for recruitment will also have an effect on
the cost of training. The authors maintain that the
complexities present in training analysis preclude accurate
cost estimating for training and that the use of the proxy
variable BFTD will yield better information since it is a
recognition of these costs. It is not considered to be the
answer to all the problems but a movement to establish
credibility in training costs and budget development.
The use of BFTDs as a proxy measure of combat effect-
iveness also allows the use of an existing information and
accounting system, the TMCS . By using this system early
in the analysis process for a new weapon system, the
opportunity is provided for field level evaluation of a
developing system. That is, field experience in costing
training will be used directly to measure the ease of
training for a conceptual system. This would appear to
achieve a signal impact on the development of training
systems for a new weapon system which are at least as
effective in the use of resources as the training system
for the old weapon system. By achieving this objective,
the Army will have improved on gaining the highest level of




ARTEP - Army Training and Evaluation Program
BFTD - Battalion Field Training Day
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COEA - Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis
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FTX - Field Training Exercise
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LCC - Life Cycle Cost
MILES - Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System
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REALTRAIN - Realistic Training
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SOP - Standard Operating Procedure
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TAC - Training Analysis for COEA
TDS - Training Development Study
TMCS - Training Management Control System
TOW - Tube launched, optically tracked, wire command-link
guided missile system
TRADOC - U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRASANA - TRADOC Systems Analysis Agency
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